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Abstract
We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian)
mechanism for settings with an arbitrary number of agents and alternatives where the
privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-peaked preferences. The optimal
outcome can be implemented by modifying a sequential voting scheme, due to Bowen
(1943), and used in many legislatures and committees. The modication uses a exible
majority threshold for each of several alternatives, and allows us to replicate, via a single
sequential procedure, the entire class of anonymous, unanimous and dominant strategy
incentive compatible mechanisms. Our analysis relies on the elegant characterization of
this class of mechanisms for single-peaked preferences by Moulin (1980) and, subsequently,
for single-crossing preferences by Saporiti (2009).
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1 Introduction
We derive the welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) mechanism for settings with an arbitrary
number of social alternatives where privately informed agents have single-crossing and single-
peaked preferences. Our analysis takes into account the agentsstrategic incentives in such
situations.
The point of departure for our analysis is a classical converse to the Median Voter
Theorem due to Moulin [1980]. Moulins result says that, on the full domain of single-peaked
preferences, all dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC), Pareto e¢ cient and anony-
mous mechanisms can be described as generalized median schemes that choose the median
among the n real peaks of actual voters and additional (n   1) xed phantom voters
peaks.1
The characterization via phantoms is not very intuitive, and we rst show that all gen-
eralized median schemes can be implemented by modifying the well-known successive voting
procedure used in European legislatures (Rasch [2000]). In this voting procedure, alterna-
tives are brought to the ballot in a pre-specied order, and at each step an alternative is
either adopted (and voting stops), or eliminated from further consideration (and the next
alternative is considered).2 Usually the result at each stage is determined by a xed, possibly
qualied majority. It is well known that, under complete information, single-peaked prefer-
ences and simple majority, the sophisticated equilibrium outcome (reached by backward
induction) of the successive voting procedures (and of many other binary voting schemes) is
the Condorcet winner, i.e., the alternative preferred by the median voter.
For the case where the alternatives are clearly dened by a numerical magnitude, such
as the level of a public good, an interest rate, a tax levy, or a minimum wage, the successive
voting procedure is equivalent to another well-known procedure, devised by Bowen [1943]
for the provision of a public good.3 Starting from a status-quo quantity of public good,
voters vote on successive increments (decrements) until no more increases (decreases) garner
a su¢ cient majority. In our modication, the majority needed for successive increases or
decreases is not constant; instead, this majority increases as the process gets further away
from the status-quo. Such staggered hurdles are commonplace in the laws governing tax or
expenditure increases (for nancing various public goods such as education or transportation)
in most U.S. states.4 For example, the legislature of Nebraska can vote to increase property
taxes reecting changes in the Consumer Price Index by simple majority, while larger increases
1Several authors have extended Moulins characterization by discarding the assumption that mechanisms
can only depend on peaks: examples are Barbera, Gul and Stacchetti [1993], Sprumont [1991], Ching [1997],
Schummer and Vohra [2002], and Chatterjee and Sen [2011].
2 In Scandinavia and the Anglo Saxon world, where the alternative amendment procedure is used, voting oc-
curs over pairs of alternatives, with the winner advancing to the next stage until all alternatives are exhausted.
Apesteguia, Ballester and Masatlioglu [2014] o¤er a parallel axiomatic characterization of both procedures.
3Bowens scheme has been extensively studied in the subsequent literature (see for example Chapter 14 in
Green and La¤ont [1979]).
4See Joyce et al. (1995) for a summary of local tax and expenditure limitations imposed by states.
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up to 5% require a three-quarters majority. Increases above 5% require a referendum in the
population. In Florida, the law sets a maximum rolled-back rate that a county can adopt to
fund the countys general public hospital. A rate of up to 110% of the rolled-back rate needs
a two-thirds majority of the countys governing body, while a rate in excess of 110% requires
a three-fourths majority, or a referendum.5
As noted above, even if formal decisions are taken by a qualied majority in a legisla-
ture, additional indirect hurdles apply to various motions, according to their main proper-
ties/potential for disruption or harm to those in a minority.6 These include quorum rules,
referenda, mandatory intervening elections, double majorities in several houses of parliaments,
or approval by additional public or federal bodies.7 The prevalent use of supermajorities and
other non-neutral measures suggests a utilitarian rationale where potential gains and losses
are weighed against each other and where minorities get proper legal protection.8
The utilitarian principle uses cardinal information and dictates the choice of an alternative
that is preferred by the average voter. At least since Galtons 1907 famous letter to Nature
where he proposes the choice of the median alternative, it has been recognized that the average
is not implementable if voters are strategic: each agent has an incentive to exaggerate her
position in order to move the average towards her preferred outcome.9
Our optimization analysis reconciles these two conicting principles implementable median-
like procedures versus non-implementable but ex-ante e¢ cient average procedures in the
best possible way for any number of voters and alternatives: this is achieved by introducing
exible adoption thresholds that depend on the respective alternative, and optimizing over
these thresholds. As a result, the optimal mechanism chooses the alternative favored by the
averagetype, but the average is not the naive one: instead it is calculated from the coarse
information that could be inferred solely from the agentsequilibrium voting behavior. In
other words, to satisfy DIC, the mechanism needs to lter the agentsinformation, and then
chooses the e¢ cient alternative given this ltration.
Our main results are:
5See Florida Statutes (2015), http://dor.myorida.com/dor/property/legislation/pdf/2015statutes.pdf.
6Public rms also use super-majority requirements when shareholders vote about major issues such as
mergers. See Gompers et al. [2003] and Bebchuk et al. [2009].
7These bodies can be seen as phantomsin Moulins analysis.
8We note that the Austrian, Belgian, Finnish, Dutch, German and US constitutions can be changed only
if two-thirds of the parliamentsmembers are in favor. Three-fths majorities for constitutional changes are
used in France, Greece and Spain.
9Galton (1907) writes: ... (1) A jury has to assess damages. (2) The council of a society has to x on a
sum of money, suitable for some particular purpose. How can the right conclusion be reached, considering that
there may be as many di¤erent estimates as there are members? That conclusion is clearly not the average of
all the estimates, which would give a voting power to cranksin proportion to their crankiness. One absurdly
large or small estimate would leave a greater impress on the result than one of reasonable amount, and the
more an estimate diverges from the bulk of the rest, the more inuence would it exert. I wish to point out that
the estimate to which least objection can be raised is the middlemost estimate, the number of votes that it is
too high being exactly balanced by the number of votes that it is too low. Every other estimate is condemned
by a majority of voters as being either too high or too low, the middlemost alone escaping this condemnation.
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1. We show that, by varying the threshold requirement in the successive voting schemes,
we can replicate the outcome of any anonymous, unanimous and DIC mechanism. The
equilibrium notion is the very simple and robust (ex-post perfect and Markov) Nash
equilibrium where, at each stage, agents use sincere strategies. Conversely, for any
successive voting scheme with decreasing thresholds, there is an anonymous, unanimous
and DIC mechanism that generates the same equilibrium outcome.
2. Under standard assumptions on preferences and their distribution (yielding symmetric,
independent, private values), we compute the adoption thresholds that maximize ex
ante expected welfare. In other words, we derive the incentive compatible optimal
mechanism (second-best). We then extend this result to the correlated case with linear
utilities, where types are independently drawn conditional on the realization of one out
of several possible states of the world.
3. We show that, for large societies where types are independently drawn, our solution
(that converges then to the rst-best) can be approximated by a xed adoption thresh-
old that equals the statistical proportion of voters with peaks below the e¢ cient alter-
native. In contrast, when types are correlated, the rst-best cannot be approximated
by a xed threshold: exible decreasing thresholds are then necessary to approximate
the rst-best even if the number of voters is very large.
Moulins characterization does not directly apply to our setting because it requires a full
domain of single-peaked preferences. Since the (standard) one-dimensional model of private
information used here cannot generate this full domain, we rely instead on an analogous result
for maximal domains of single-crossing preferences, due to Saporiti [2009].10 To understand
the logic of our results, let m(k) be the number of phantom voters with peaks to the left of,
and including alternative k, in a generalized median mechanism. By denition, this function
is increasing. The outcome of the median mechanism with such phantom distribution can
be replicated by the sincere equilibrium of the successive voting procedure among privately
informed agents where the adoption threshold for alternative k is decreasing, and given by
(k) = n m(k).11 The optimization task is then of combinatorial nature, to determine the
optimal, decreasing function  as a function of the agentspreferences and their distribution.
Since the domain of maximization is nite, a solution always exists. The main di¢ culty is the
analytic identication of the solution and its properties. Just to give an example, the June
1991 successive voting procedure that determined the new capital of the reunited Germany
involved 658 members of parliament and 4 alternatives.12 This yields 47 698 420 di¤erent
10A well-known application of a social choice framework with single-crossing preferences is voting over linear
tax schedules see for example, Roberts [1977], Romer [1975], and Meltzer and Richard [1981].
11Although they do not refer to the successive voting procedure, our argument is inspired by Barbera, Gul
and Stacchettis [1993] interpretation of generalized median mechanisms in terms of coalitional systems. See
also the survey by Barbera [2001].
12Besides simple alternatives such as Bonn and Berlin, there were composite ones that involved di¤erent
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anonymous, unanimous and incentive compatible mechanisms among which we look for the
optimal one (see formula (7) below).
We also briey sketch how our model could be used on actual data. Just to give an
example, assume that income is the relevant dening type of voters. Then, for a large
population with an income inequality measure in the observed range of Western democracies
(where Gini coe¢ cients are between 0.25 and 0.55) our approach suggests that a required ma-
jority of about two-thirds will be approximately optimal and relatively stable under changes
of the underlying distribution.13
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this Section we review
the related literature. In Section 2 we describe the social choice model and the mechanism
design problem. In Subsection 2.1 we illustrate the model and some implications of incentive
compatibility in the simple special case where utilities are linear. In particular, we show that
the welfare-maximizing rule (rst-best) is not implementable although it is monotone. In
Section 3 we rst introduce the modication of the successive voting procedure and derive an
ex-post Nash equilibrium where voters vote sincerely. Next, we prove that, for any unanimous
and anonymous DIC mechanism, there exists a successive voting procedure with decreasing
majority requirements that generates the same outcome, and vice versa. In Section 4 we use
the equivalence result to derive the precise decreasing sequence of the majority thresholds
associated with the ex-ante welfare maximizing DIC mechanism. In Section 4.1 we illustrate
some of the insights, including comparative statics, for the case of linear utilities. Section 5
treats the case of decisions with large number of voters. In Section 6 we extend our results
to the case of correlated types. Section 7 concludes. All omitted proofs are in Appendix
A. Appendix B discusses the regularity condition used in the characterization of optimal
mechanisms.
Related Literature
A large body of work has focused on the implementation of desirable social choice rules
in abstract frameworks with ordinal preferences. Classical results include the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem (Gibbard [1973] and Satterthwaite [1975]) and the Me-
dian Voter Theorem for settings with single-peaked preferences (see Black [1948]). Preference
intensities are not part of those models and maximization goals are not easily formulated
within them.
The idea of comparing voting rules in terms of the ex-ante expected utility they generate
goes back to Rae [1969].14 That paper and almost the entire following literature focus on
locations of parliament and government.
13The two-thirds requirement probably stems from the rules for electing a new pope, devised by Pope
Alexander III in 1179. Although only unanimity was thought to reveal the will of God, Pope Pius II summa-
rized his own election in 1458: What is done by two thirds of the sacred college, that is surely of the Holy
Ghost, which may not be resisted(in Gragg and Gabel, 1959: 88).
14A recent analysis of the median versus the mean mechanism is in Rosar [2012].
5
settings with two social alternatives (a reform and a status quo, say). Schmitz and Tröger
[2012] identify qualied majority rules as ex-ante welfare maximizing in the class of DIC
mechanisms with two alternatives this can be seen as an implication of our main result.15
Azrieli and Kim [2014] nicely complement this analysis for two alternatives by showing that
any interim Pareto e¢ cient, Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) choice rule must be a
qualied majority rule. Dekel and Piccione [2000], Callander [2007] and Ali and Kartik [2012]
analyzed procedures where voters act sequentially, one after the other. In their settings, there
are two alternatives and voters have common or interdependent values.
Drexl and Kleiner [2013] also conne attention to settings with two social alternatives
and show that a principal who wishes to maximize the agentswelfare from the physical allo-
cation minus potential transfers to outsiders will use a mechanism that does not involve any
monetary transfers. In particular, for settings with two alternatives, their optimal mechanism
coincides with the one derived in this paper.
The situation dramatically changes when there are three, or more alternatives: the
DIC/BIC constraints and the mechanisms themselves are much more numerous and com-
plex. Börgers and Postl [2009] study a setting with three alternatives where it is common
knowledge that the top alternative for one agent is the bottom for the other, and vice-versa.
The agents di¤er in the relative intensity of their preferences for a middle alternative (the
compromise). In addition to a characterization of BIC mechanisms, Börgers and Postl con-
duct numerical simulations and show that the e¢ ciency loss from second-best rules is often
small.
Apesteguia, Ballester and Ferrer [2011] consider a general social choice model with car-
dinal utility. Strategic voting is not considered in their analysis this would lead there to
impossibility results and the scoring rules that emerge as optimal in their analysis are known
to be subject to strategic manipulation.
Flexible thresholds have been advocated with a clear utilitarian rationale in mind by
Gersbach and Pachl [2009] in the context of the common European monetary policy: the
size of the required majority should depend monotonically on the proposed change in interest
rate. In this way, small shocks a¤ecting only a few countries can be readily accommodated,
while radical changes that a¤ect the entire Euro area should only be implemented if they
command a broad support. Interestingly, Riboni and Ruge-Murcia [2010] empirically show
that (sincere) successive voting, augmented by a supermajority requirement, best explains
the decision on interest rates by monetary committees at several major, independent central
banks.
2 The Social Choice Model
We consider n agents who have to choose one out of K mutually exclusive alternatives. Let
K = f1; :::;Kg denote the set of alternatives. Agent i 2 f1; :::; ng has (cardinal) utility uk(xi),
15These authors also perform an analysis for Bayesian mechanisms, which is not covered by our study.
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where k 2 K is the chosen alternative and where xi is a parameter (or type) privately known
to agent i only. We assume that uk(xi) is continuous in xi for any k. The types x1; :::; xn
are distributed on the interval [x; x]n ; 0  x < x < 1, according to a commonly known,
joint cumulative distribution function 	 with density  having full support.16 This is the
one-dimensional, private values specication, the most common one in the vast literature on
optimal mechanism design with monetary transfers. Monetary transfers, however, are not
allowed here.
Agentsutilities are assumed to be single-crossing with respect to the order of alternatives
1; :::;K. Formally, for any two alternatives k and l with k < l, we assume that there exists a
unique cuto¤ type xk;l with ul(xk;l) = uk(xk;l) such that17(
uk (xi) > u
l (xi) if xi < xk;l
uk (xi) < u
l (xi) if xi > xk;l
: (1)
To simplify notation, we denote xk  xk 1;k. We further assume that each alternative is the
top alternative for some type of the agents.18 That is, for any k 2 K, there exists xi 2 [x; x]
such that
uk (xi) > max
l2K;l 6=k
ul (xi) : (2)
We shall focus on the case of a utilitarian planner whose objective is to maximize the sum
of the agentsexpected utilities
max
k2K
E
hX
i
uk (xi)
i
.
Remark 1 The single-crossing property (1), together with assumption (2), implies that the
cuto¤s xk are well-ordered:
x  x1 < ::: < xK < xK+1  x: (3)
To see this, we note that, by denition of xk and the single-crossing property (1),
uk (xi) < u
k 1 (xi) for all xi < xk:
Similarly, by denition of xk+1 and the single-crossing property (1), we have
uk (xi) < u
k+1 (xi) for all xi > xk+1:
If xk  xk+1, any type xi satises either xi  xk or xi  xk+1, and thus alternative k is
(weakly) dominated either by alternative k  1 or by alternative k+ 1, which contradicts (2).
16We can allow x =1 as long as uk(xi) is bounded for all k.
17We also assume that the indi¤erence types xk;l are di¤erent across pairs, which is a generic assumption.
18This assumption ensures that our single-crossing preferences are also single-peaked (see Remark 1). How-
ever, it rules out the setting of Börgers and Postl [2009] where the third alternative, compromise, is not the
top alternative of any agent.
7
Therefore, we must have xk < xk+1 for all k 2 K, which proves (3). By the denition of xk
and by (3), agents with type xi have k as their top alternative if and only if xi 2

xk; xk+1

.
Note also that the agentspreferences are single-peaked. To see this, consider agent i with
type xi 2
 
xk; xk+1

. By denition of xk, agent i prefers alternative k to any alternative
l < k, and by denition of xk+1, agent i prefers k over any l > k. Consider two alternatives
l and m with l < m < k. Since xl < xm < xk, we have xi > xl;m and agent i prefers m to
l. Similarly, agent i prefers m to l if k < m < l. Therefore, agent is preferences are single-
peaked. On the other hand, our preference domain is a strict subset of the full single-peaked
preference domain whenever K > 3: not all single-peaked preferences are compatible with our
environment (see below an explicit illustration in the linear environment).
A deterministic, direct mechanism asks agents to report their types, and, for any prole
of reports, the mechanism chooses one alternative from K. Formally, a deterministic direct
mechanism is a function g : [x; x]n ! K = f1; :::;Kg. A deterministic mechanism is dominant
strategy incentive compatible (DIC) if for any player i and for any xi; x0i and x i:
ug(xi;x i) (xi)  ug(x0i;x i) (xi) . (4)
It is clear from the above denition that two types that have the same ordinal preferences
must be treated in the same way by a DIC mechanism. Thus, an implication of the lack
of monetary transfers is that deterministic DIC mechanisms cannot depend on preference
intensities.
2.1 An Illustration: Linear Preferences
Suppose the utilities are linear: uk (xi) = ak + bkxi. These preferences are necessarily single-
crossing. We assume that bK > bK 1 > ::: > b1  0 and a1 > a2 > ::: > aK . The cuto¤ type
who is indi¤erent between two adjacent alternatives k and k   1 is given by
xk  xk 1;k = ak 1   ak
bk   bk 1 : (5)
We impose further restrictions on bk and ak so that our previous assumption (2) is satised.19
These restrictions, together with the denition of xk;l, imply that xk;l 2 (xk+1; xl) for l > k+1,
because
xk;l =
ak   al
bl   bk =
(ak   ak+1) + :::+ (al 1   al)
(bk+1   bk) + :::+ (bl   bl 1) :
Similarly to the general case, we assume that xk;l are di¤erent across pairs.
Our preference domain is a strict subset of the full single-peaked preference domain.
Indeed, consider a setting with 4 di¤erent alternatives (1; 2; 3 and 4) with x1;4 2  x1;2; x3;4.
19That is, we assume that for all k  2 ;
ak 1   ak
bk   bk 1 <
ak   ak+1
bk+1   bk ;
so cuto¤s are ordered according to (3).
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If x1;4 2  x2;3; x3;4, as shown in Figure 1, then the feasible single-peaked preferences that
have alternative 2 on their top are 2  1  3  4 and 2  3  1  4. In particular,
the preference 2  3  4  1 is not compatible with the linear environment. Similarly, if
x1;4 2  x1;2; x2;3, the feasible single-peaked preferences that have alternative 3 on their top
are 3  2  4  1 and 3  4  2  1. Here the preference prole 3  2  1  4 is not
compatible with our structure.
Alternative 4
Alternative 3
Alternative 2
Alternative 1
2,1x 3,2x 4,3x
4,1x
ix
),( ixku
Figure 1: Not all single-peaked preferences are compatible with our linear structure.
Analogously to the classical framework with monetary transfers, a mechanism g (xi; x i)
is DIC if and only if (i) for all x i and for all i, g (xi; x i) is increasing in xi; and (ii) for any
agent i, any xi 2 [x; x] and x i 2 [x; x]n 1, the following envelope condition holds
ug(xi;x i) (xi) = u
g(0;x i) (0) +
Z xi
0
bg(z;x i)dz: (6)
When monetary transfers are feasible, any monotone decision rule g (xi; x i) is incentive
compatible since it is always possible to augment it with a transfer such that the equality
required by (6) holds. Thus, with transfers, only monotonicity really matters for DIC. If
monetary transfers were available, the welfare-maximizing allocation would be implementable
via the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. But, without monetary transfers,
not all monotone decision rules g (xi; x i) are implementable, and in particular, the welfare
maximizing allocation need not be incentive compatible although it is monotone. This well-
known phenomenon is illustrated in the next example.
Example 1 (First-best Rule Not Implementable) Consider the linear environment with
two alternatives f1; 2g, two agents fi; ig and [x; x] = [0; 1]. The designer is indi¤erent be-
tween alternatives 1 and 2 if
2a1 + b1 (xi + x i) = 2a2 + b2 (xi + x i) :
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The rst-best rule conditions on the value of the average type, and is given by
g (xi; x i) =
(
1 if 12 (xi + x i) 2 [0; x2)
2 if 12 (xi + x i) 2 [x2; 1]
where the cuto¤ x2 is dened in (5): x2  (a1   a2) = (b2   b1). The rst-best rule is increas-
ing in both xi and x i. Yet, it is not implementable. To see this, consider the realization of
types (xi; x i) = (x2 + ; x2   2) where  > 0 is small. Then 12 (xi + x i) < x2, and hence
g (xi; x i) = 1; which is not optimal for player i. By misreporting any type above x2 + 2
player i can shift the decision to his preferred alternative 2. Therefore, this mechanism is not
DIC.
3 The Successive Voting Procedure
In this procedure, alternatives are rst arranged in some pre-determined voting order, say
1; 2; :::;K. The rst ballot determines whether there is a (qualied) majority for alternative 1.
If so, alternative 1 is adopted and voting ends. If alternative 1 fails to command a majority,
this alternative is removed from future consideration, and the parliament proceeds to vote
on alternative 2. If a majority supports alternative 2, alternative 2 is adopted; otherwise,
the agents proceeds to vote on alternative 3. Voting continues until one alternative gains
majority. If no alternative gains majority in earlier stages, the last two alternatives K   1
and K are paired and the one with majority support is adopted. In most cases, the required
majority for adoption is the same across alternatives, and the voting order is either suggested
by the agenda setter or is pre-determined by custom. Without single-peaked preferences, the
voting outcome (even under complete information) is sensitive to the voting order.20
In order to link the successive procedure to unanimous, anonymous and DIC mechanisms,
we consider a modied successive procedure with two properties. First, the order of vote is
according to the natural order (1; 2; :::;K) under which the preferences are single-peaked
(see Remark 1).21 Second, the required majority for adoption is no longer kept constant
across alternatives: instead, the adoption threshold for choosing alternative k,  (k), is a
decreasing function. That is, a more stringent majority requirement (which may be more or
less than simple majority) is set for earlier alternatives, while a lower majority is required
for adopting later alternatives. Equivalently put, it becomes increasingly di¢ cult to keep the
voting process in motion.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the modied successive procedure can also be seen as
a simple variation of the classical Bowens scheme for public good provision. There voters
vote on successive increments (or decrements) to the status quo  the quantity of public
good already provided. If a simple majority of voters are against the rst increment, voting
20 If voters vote sincerely, later alternatives have better chance to be adopted (Black [1958]), but if voters
vote strategically earlier alternatives are more likely to be adopted (Farquharson [1969]).
21Alternatively, the successive voting procedure can be run in reverse order.
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stops and the status quo is adopted. If the rst increment gains a majority support, voting
continues to another increment. If the second increment fails to gain a simple majority
support, the voting stops and the rst increment is implemented, otherwise, voters are asked
to vote yet another increment, and so on. Therefore, if the underlying collective decision is
numerical in nature and has a clear direction of change, the natural order of alternatives of
our modied procedure is the same as in Bowens scheme, but we have a declining threshold
 (k) for adopting alternative k, which corresponds to an increasing threshold for voting on
further increments in Bowens original formulation.
The results in this section are purely ordinal, and thus do not depend on the particular
cardinal specication of utility (nor on the distribution of types) as long as the single-crossing
assumption is satised and the domain of preferences is maximal with respect to single-
crossing.22
Denition 1 1. A voting strategy for an agent is sincere if, at each stage, the agent votes
in favor of the respective alternative if and only if it is the best (among the remaining
alternatives) given his preferences.
2. A voting strategy for an agent is monotone if it consists of a series of No in early
stages (possible none), followed by a series of Yes in all later stages.
Note that, with single-peaked preferences and with our natural voting order, a sincere
strategy has a particular structure: the agent votes Nofor all alternatives that appear on
the ballot before his most preferred one (he wants the voting to continue), and then votes
Yesfor his peak alternative and for all successive ones (he wants the voting to stop). Hence,
under the successive voting rule with the natural order, monotone voting is a generalization
of sincere voting.23 The next result holds for the entire domain of single-peaked preferences.24
Proposition 1 Consider the successive procedure with a decreasing threshold function  (k) ;
and assume that all agents except agent i use monotone voting strategies. Then, the sincere
voting strategy is optimal for agent i. In particular, the strategy prole where all agents vote
sincerely constitutes an ex-post perfect Nash equilibrium.25
Proof. Assume that all agents other than i use monotone strategies, and let the peak of
agent i be on alternative k. Consider rst an alternative k0 < k. The sincere voting strategy
22A domain of preferences is maximal with respect to single-crossing if one cannot add to it another ordinal
preference prole without violating the single crossing property (see Saporiti [2009] for a formal denition).
23Monotone strategies are also Markov, i.e., they do not condition on the history of votes before the current
one.
24The amendment procedure where alternatives are voted one against the other in the natural order (or its
reverse) and the winner advances to the next stage given some (exible) qualied majority need not possess
an ex-post, sincere equilibrium.
25An n-tuple strategy prole is said to constitute an ex-post perfect equilibrium if at every stage, and for
every realization of private information, the n-tuple of continuation strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium
of the subgame in which the realization of the agentstypes is common knowledge.
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calls for i to vote against k0. A deviation from sincere voting matters only if, by changing
his strategy from Noto Yesat this stage, alternative k0 is chosen whereas it would not
be chosen if i voted sincerely. But in this case, the number of Yesvotes for alternative k0
must be (k0)  1. Since  is decreasing, and since all other agents use monotone strategies,
voting Noon alternative k0 implies that, in this case, agent i can ensure that the chosen
alternative k00 satises k0 < k00  k (either voting stops before reaching k; or i ensures the
choice of k by voting Yeson it, and then joining at least (k0)  1  (k)  1 Yesvotes).
All alternatives k00 with k0 < k00  k are preferred by i to k0, so this deviation from sincere
voting is not benecial. Consider now k0  k: The sincere strategy calls for i to vote Yes
at the relevant stage. By deviating to No, the chosen alternative must satisfy k00  k0:
All these alternatives are dominated by k0 from is point of view, so a deviation is again not
benecial. This completes the proof of optimality of the sincere voting strategy for agent i.
Since the argument applies to all agents, and since sincere voting is monotone, sincere voting
constitutes an ex-post perfect Nash equilibrium.26
Remark 2 The above result applies, as stated, for the case where the results of previous vot-
ing stages is not revealed: the only possible inference at a particular stage is that no earlier
alternative has obtained a necessary majority. In practical applications one needs to consider
more permissive information disclosure policies, such as revealing the margin of past deci-
sions, or even the individual voting records. By the robust nature of the ex-post equilibrium,
where agents do not regret their strategies even if all private information is revealed ex-post,
sincere voting after each history remains an ex-post perfect equilibrium for any disclosure
policy. But, disclosing more information adds more strategies and potential equilibria. Nev-
ertheless, we show in Lemma 1 in Appendix A that, irrespective of the disclosure policy,
sincere voting is the unique outcome that survives iterated elimination of (weakly) dominated
strategies. This gives another strong rationale for the simplest, sincere equilibrium. The
reader may also notice the close parallels to the implementation, via a dynamic auction, of
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism due to Ausubel [2004].
We now uncover the connection between the outcome of any DIC mechanisms and the
sincere equilibria of the successive procedures with decreasing thresholds. An inuential
paper by Moulin [1980] shows that, if each agent is restricted to report his top alternative
only, then every DIC, Pareto e¢ cient and anonymous voting scheme on the full domain of
single-peaked preferences is equivalent to a generalized median voter scheme that is obtained
by adding (n  1) xed peaks (phantoms) to the n votersreported peaks and then choosing
the median of this larger set of peaks.
26Bowens procedure for public good provision is analyzed, under incomplete information, by Green and
La¤ont [1979]. They erroneously claim (Theorem 14.2) that sincere voting constitutes an equilibrium in
dominant strategies. This holds only if agents are a-priori restricted to play monotone strategies, as dened
here.
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Moulins characterization also holds in our setting although agents are not restricted to
report only their peaks, and although the domain of preferences is a strict subset of the full
domain of single-peaked preferences. The relevant result is due to Saporiti [2009]: he provides
a characterization of unanimous, anonymous and DIC mechanisms for maximal domains of
single-crossing preferences, in a spirit similar to Moulin [1980].
To get some intuition about Moulins characterization, consider a mechanism that always
picks the top alternative of the agent with the lowest type (an analogous intuition works for
other order statistics). Such a mechanism is clearly DIC, Pareto e¢ cient and anonymous. It
can be replicated by a generalized median that places all (n  1) phantoms at alternative 1,
because the median of the n real votes and the (n  1) phantoms is always the top alternative
of the lowest type agent. The number of phantoms cannot be n because then generalized
median is not uniquely dened. It cannot be n+1 or higher, because the resulting generalized
median may not be Pareto e¢ cient. For example, if there are (n+ 1) phantoms all placed
at alternative 1, then alternative 1 is the generalized median, which may not be Pareto
e¢ cient.27
To formally state the connection between DIC mechanisms and the successive procedures,
we need several denitions:
Denition 2 1. A mechanism g is unanimous if xi 2
 
xk; xk+1

for all i implies g (x) =
k.
2. A mechanism g is Pareto e¢ cient if, for any prole of reports (xi; x i) 2 [x; x]n ; there
is no alternative k 2 K such that uk(xi)  ug(x)(xi) for all i, with strict inequality for
at least one agent.
3. A mechanism g is anonymous if, for any prole of reports (xi; x i) 2 [x; x]n ; g (x1; :::; xn) =
g
 
x(1); :::; x(n)

where  denotes any permutation of the set f1; :::; ng.
It is clear that a Pareto-e¢ cient mechanism is unanimous. In the presence of dominant
strategy incentive compatibility, an anonymous and unanimous mechanism is also Pareto
e¢ cient (Corollary 1 in Saporiti [2009]). We are now ready to state our rst main result.
Theorem 1 1. For any unanimous and anonymous DIC mechanism g; there exists a
decreasing threshold function  g (k) with  g (k)  n for all k 2 K and  g (K) = 1 such
that, for any realization of types, the outcome of g coincides with the outcome in the
sincere equilibrium of successive procedure with thresholds  g (k).
2. Conversely, for any decreasing threshold function  (k) with  (k)  n for all k 2 K and
 (K) = 1; there exists an anonymous, unanimous and DIC mechanism g such that,
27Pareto e¢ ciency implies that the chosen alternative must be between the top alternatives of the agents
with the lowest and the highest type). Moulin shows that all DIC and anonymous (not necessarily Pareto
e¢ cient) mechanisms can be replicated by a generalized median with (n+ 1) phantoms.
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for any realization of types, the outcome of g coincides with the outcome of the sincere
equilibrium in successive procedure with thresholds  (k).
Proof. 1. Our underlying domain of ordinal preferences is maximal with respect to single-
crossing. To see this, note that every two alternatives, say k and l, induce a cuto¤ xk;l, and
each cuto¤ xk;l divides the set of types into two intervals where ordinal preferences di¤er with
respect to the ordering of alternative k and l.28 Since each alternative is top for some types,
the interval of types is thus partitioned into K(K   1)=2 + 1 parts, each corresponding to
a distinct ordinal preference. But this is also the maximum number of ordinal proles in a
maximal domain of single-crossing preferences on K alternatives.
Saporiti [2009] shows that, on a maximal domain of (ordinal) single-crossing preferences
any anonymous, unanimous and DIC mechanism in an environment with n voters can be
obtained as a generalized median voter mechanism with n 1 phantom voters.29 In the dom-
inant strategy equilibrium of such a generalized median voter scheme, all n voters truthfully
report their top alternatives, and the outcome is the median of the n real peaks and the n 1
xed phantom peaks.
Let `k  0 denote the number of phantom voters with peak on alternative k in the
generalized median voter scheme corresponding to a DIC mechanism g. To construct an
equivalent successive voting scheme, we dene the thresholds  g(k)  n Pkm=1 `m, and note
that  g (k) is decreasing and that  g (K) = 1:
Alternative 1 is the generalized median only if the number of (real) agents who report this
alternative as their top alternative exceeds n   `1 =  g (1). Alternative 2 is the generalized
median if the number of agents who report a peak on alternative 1 is less than n   `1 and
if the number of the agents who report either alternative 1 or alternative 2 as their top
alternative is at least n  `1  `2 =  g (2). In general, alternative k is the generalized median
if, for any k0 < k; the number of reported peaks on alternatives 1; 2; :::; k0 was strictly less
than  g(k0) and if the number of agents who report their peak on alternative k or lower is at
least n  Pkm=1 `m =  g(k): Otherwise, alternative K is the generalized median. With this
interpretation, it is now clear that the outcome of the sincere equilibrium under successive
voting with threshold  g (k) coincides with the outcome of mechanism g:
2. Conversely, for a given successive procedure with decreasing cuto¤s  (k) such that
 (k)  n for any k 2 K and  (K) = 1, we can dene `1  n  (1) ; and `k   (k   1)  (k)
for k  2. Since  (k) is decreasing,  (k)  n for all k 2 K and  (K) = 1, we have `k  0
for all k 2 K and PKk=1 `k = n    (K) = n   1. The constructed phantom distribution
f`kg is part of a generalized median voter scheme which corresponds to some unanimous and
anonymous DIC mechanism g . Moreover, it is easy to verify that the outcome of mechanism
g is the same as the sincere equilibrium outcome in successive voting with threshold  (k).
28Recall the (generic) assumption that all xk;l are distinct.
29See Theorem 3 in the Appendix A for a formal statement of Saporitis characterization.
14
The above theorem implies that the search for optimal mechanisms within the class of
successive procedures with decreasing cuto¤s  (k) is without loss of generality. With many
agents and alternatives, this remains a rather complex discrete optimization problem since
there are many decreasing sequences  (k) : the number of DIC, anonymous and unanimous
mechanisms for n agents and K alternatives is given by30
(n+K   2)!
(K   1)! (n  1)! : (7)
We conclude this Section with a simple illustration of the welfare benet of having exible
thresholds.
Example 2 There are three alternatives, denoted by 1; 2; 3, and preferences are single-peaked
with respect to the order: 1; 2; 3. Assume for simplicity and concreteness that all feasible
ordinal single-peaked rankings occur with the same probability. Note that alternative 2 is
never ranked as the bottom alternative in such a scenario.31 Endow each agent with a simple
cardinal preference where the top alternative yields utility  > 0, the middle alternative yields
utility 0, and the bottom alternative yields utility  < 0 with jj  .32 Whenever some agents
rank alternative 1 at the top and other agents rank alternative 3 at the top, the only way to
avoid a substantial utility loss is to choose alternative 2. This outcome cannot be achieved
by any xed threshold policy since, for any such policy (for example simple majority with
(k) = (n + 1)=2, k = 1; 2; 3), there is a positive probability of choosing either alternative 1
or alternative 3. In contrast, the successive procedure with the decreasing threshold function
(1) = n; (2) = (3) = 1 always generates positive utility since: 1) it chooses alternatives
1 and 3 only when there is unanimity in their favor (yielding welfare n > 0), and chooses
alternative 2 otherwise (yielding welfare n2 > 0; where n2 is the number of agents who rank
2 at the top).
4 The Optimal Mechanism
We now characterize the welfare maximizing allocations that respect the incentive constraints
(constrained e¢ ciency, or second-best). We rst introduce two assumptions that put more
structure on the optimization problem, allowing us to solve it analytically.
Assumption A Agents signals are distributed identically and independently of each other
on the interval [x; x] according to a cumulative distribution F with density f .
30The problem is to partition (n  1) phantoms into K alternatives, which can be represented by (K   1)
bars placed among (n   1) balls. Hence, it is equivalent to choosing (K   1) out of (n+K   2) positions to
place (K   1) bars.
31This insight is more general and it applies irrespective of the number of alternatives: alternatives that
are not extreme in the linear order determining single-peakedness cannot be ranked at the bottom of the
preference list.
32We can approximate these utilities through our continuous, type-dependent function uk (xi).
15
This assumption yields the standard symmetric, independent private values model (SIPV)
that is widely used in the literature on trading mechanisms with transfers (where utility is
usually linear). We need another joint requirement on the utility functions and on the dis-
tribution of types, ensuring that the optimal threshold function  which necessarily exists
and is monotone is identied by the necessary rst order conditions, and thus amenable to
analysis. We rst need some notation. Let us dene, for all k  2 and l  1,
ulx<xk = E
h
ul (x) jx < xk
i
as the expected utility from alternative l; conditional on the agents type x being lower than
the cuto¤ xk. Similarly, we dene
ulx>xk = E
h
ul (x) jx > xk
i
as the expected utility from alternative l conditional on the agents type x being higher than
the cuto¤ xk. With single-crossing preferences, the entire (convex) interval of types below
(above) xk prefer alternative k   1 to k (alternative k to k   1). Finally, let us dene
 (k) =

uk
x>xk
  uk 1
x>xk


uk 1
x<xk
  uk
x<xk

+

uk
x>xk
  uk 1
x>xk
 ; k  2: (8)
By the denition of xk and by the single-crossing property, uk 1
x<xk
> uk
x<xk
and uk
x>xk
> uk 1
x>xk
.
Therefore,  (k) 2 (0; 1) for all k  2.
Assumption B The function  is decreasing.
The function  plays a crucial rule in our analysis and is intimately related to the optimal
threshold function . In order to better understand its denition, we can rewrite (8) as
 (k)

uk 1
x<xk
  ukx<xk

+ [1   (k)]

uk 1
x>xk
  ukx>xk

= 0:
Suppose that the chosen alternative changes from k to k  1. The expected gain for an agent
with type below xk is uk 1
x<xk
  uk
x<xk
, while the expected loss for an agent with type above
xk is uk 1
x>xk
 uk
x>xk
. The function  is dened such that the expected gain weighted by  (k)
and the expected loss weighted by 1   (k) cancel out.
In Appendix B we derive su¢ cient conditions on the primitives of the social choice model
(utility functions and the distribution of types) for the above assumption to hold. In Sec-
tion 4.1, where we assume linear utility, we show how it reduces to simple and well-known
conditions on the distribution function only.
Consider then an environment with n voters, and let  be the optimal threshold function
in the successive procedure. The analysis is based on the following simple observation. Fix
any alternative k with  (k   1) >  (k). If  (k   1) and  (k) are part of the optimal
voting procedure, then increasing  (k) by 1 or decreasing  (k   1) by 1 should weakly
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reduce the total expected utility.33 For instance, increasing  (k) by 1 (while keeping  (k0)
with k0 6= k unchanged) has an impact only if it changes the chosen alternative. The proposed
deviation will change the chosen alternative only if there are exactly  (k) voters with values
below xk+1. These arguments generate the following bounds on the threshold function :
 (k   1)  n (k) + 1, for all k  2; (9)
 (k)  n (k + 1) , for all k  K   1: (10)
The proposed deviation, however, is not feasible for alternative k with  (k   1) =  (k),
because the cuto¤ function  (k) must be weakly decreasing. It turns out that, under
Assumption B, the two derived bounds (9) and (10) remain valid also for alternatives k with
 (k   1) =  (k) (see Lemma 2 in Appendix A). Since  (k)has to be integer, the above
two bounds lead to an essentially unique threshold function.
Theorem 2 Let dze denote the smallest integer that is above z. Under Assumptions A and
B, the sincere equilibrium of the successive procedure with the threshold function
(k) =
(
dn (k + 1)e if k < K
1 if k = K
implements the optimal anonymous, unanimous and DIC mechanism.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above theorem reveals that adding or eliminating an alternative has only a local
e¤ect. That is, adding an alternative k1 such that an interval

xk; xk+1

is further divided
into

xk; xk1

and

xk1 ; xk+1

changes only the threshold of alternative k. Similarly, the elim-
ination of an alternative k changes the threshold of alternative k  1 only, without any e¤ect
on the other alternatives. This locality-e¤ect follows from the single-peaked preferences:
the social planner does not want to change the chosen alternative if the peak of the median
voter does not change as a result of adding/eliminating alternatives.
The following corollary characterizes the optimal voting rule for the case of two alter-
natives by specifying the optimal qualied majority rule (or super-majority).34 Note that
Assumption B is not needed for the case of two alternatives.
Corollary 1 Suppose there are n agents and only two alternatives, K = 2. Under Assump-
tion A, the optimal rule is implemented through the sequential procedure where alternative 1
is chosen if and only if at least  (1) = dn (2)e voters voted in its favour.
33 In the language of phantoms, increasing  (k) by 1 while keeping other cuto¤s unchanged corresponds to
moving one phantom voter from alternative k to alternative k+1 in the generalized median voter scheme. Sim-
ilarly, decreasing  (k   1) by 1 while keeping other cuto¤s unchanged is equivalent to shifting one phantom
from alternative k to alternative k   1.
34See Nehring [2004], Barbera and Jackson [1994] and Schmitz and Tröger [2012] for related results.
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4.1 The Linear Case
We now illustrate our characterization of optimal mechanisms in the linear environment set
out in Section 2.1. For this environment, we rst derive a more intuitive assumption to
replace Assumption B. Let X be the random variable governing the agentstype. We rst
recall two well-known concepts from the theory of reliability:
Denition 3 1. The mean residual life (MRL) of a random variable X 2 [x; x] is dened
as
MRL(x) =
(
E [X   xjX > x] if x < x
0 if x = x
A random variable X satises the decreasing mean residual life (DMRL) property if the
function MRL (x) is decreasing in x. This is equivalent to requiring that the functionR x
x (1  F (t))dt is log-convex where F is the CDF of X:
2. The reversed mean residual life (RMRL) of a random variable X 2 [x; x] is dened as
RMRL (x) =
(
E [x XjX < x] if x > x
0 if x = x
A random variable X satises the increasing reversed mean residual life (IRMRL) prop-
erty if the function RMRL (x) is increasing in x. This is equivalent to requiring that
the function
R x
x F (t)dt is log-concave where F is the CDF of X:
If we let X denote the life-time of a component, then MRL (x) measures the mean
remaining life of a component that has survived until time x: intuitively this should decrease
as the component ages. The function RMRL(x) measures the mean time since the failure of
a component that has already failed by time x: intuitively this should increase as x increases.
The DMRL and IRMRL properties hold for a large, non-parametric, class of distributions
(in fact a lifetime with decreasing RMRL does not even exist on an unbounded interval).
A simple su¢ cient condition for both properties to hold is the log-concavity of the density
function f .35
In the linear setting, the function  that determines the optimal thresholds becomes
 (k) =
E

XjX > xk  xk
E [XjX > xk]  E [XjX < xk] =
1
1 +
E[xk XjX<xk]
E[X xkjX>xk]
; (11)
and therefore a su¢ cient condition for  to decrease is:
35The log-concavity of density is stronger than (and implies) increasing failure rate (IFR) which is equivalent
to log-concavity of the reliability function (1  F ). Moreover, it implies the logconcavity of F and R x
x
F (t)dt
which is equivalent to IRMRL. The family of log-concave densities is large and includes many commonly used
distributions such as uniform, normal, exponential, logistic, extreme value etc. The power function distribution
(F (x) = (x)s) has log-concave density if s  1, but it does not if s < 1. However, one can easily verify that
the two properties in Assumption Bstill hold for F (x) = (x)s even with s < 1. Therefore, a log-concave
density is not necessary. See Bagnoli and Bergstrom [2005] for an excellent discussion of these implications.
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Assumption BThe random variable X governing the distribution of types has both DMRL
and IRMRL properties.
Corollary 2 Suppose utilities are linear and Assumptions A and Bhold. The sincere equi-
librium of the successive procedure with the threshold function
(k) =
(
dn (k + 1)e if k < K
1 if k = K
implements the optimal anonymous, unanimous and DIC mechanism.
To get a better intuition for the characterization, consider the optimal threshold  (k)
for alternative k. Ignoring the integer problem, the threshold is chosen such that, in case of
pivotality, the inferred average type (given the information revealed by this event) is exactly
the cuto¤ type xk+1 who is indi¤erent among alternatives k and k+1. To see this, recall that
in case of pivotality there are exactly (k) = n (k + 1) agents with types in the interval
x; xk+1

, while all the remaining n  n (k + 1) agents have types in the interval xk+1; x.
Given this information, it follows from the denition of  (see equation 11) that the inferred
average type is
 (k + 1)E
h
XjX < xk+1
i
+ (1   (k + 1))E
h
XjX > xk+1
i
= xk+1. (12)
We can obtain immediate and intuitive comparative statics with respect to parameters
of the linear utility function fak; bkgKk=1. By the denition of xk, increases in either ak or
bk decrease xk and increase xk+1, which in turn leads to a higher threshold (k   1) for
adopting alternative k   1, and a lower threshold (k) for adopting alternative k. That
is, if the attractiveness of any alternative increases, the chances of adopting that alternative
increase as well.
Our next proposition shows how the entire optimal threshold function  changes with
respect to the distribution of types. It uses the following well known stochastic orders (see
Shaked and Shanthikumar [2007]). Let st denote the standard rst order stochastic domi-
nance relation.
Denition 4 1. A random variable Y dominates a random variable X in the hazard rate
order (denoted as X hr Y ) if [XjX > x] st [Y jY > x] for all x:
2. A random variable Y dominates a random variable X in the reverse hazard rate order
(denoted as X rh Y ) if [XjX < x] st [Y jY < x] for all x:
3. A random variable Y dominates a random variable X in the likelihood ratio order
(denoted as X lr Y ) if [Xja  X  b] st [Y ja  Y  b] for all a < b:
It is clear from the above denitions that X lr Y implies both X hr Y and X rh Y .
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Proposition 2 Consider two distinct type distributions F and eF . Let X and eX be the
random variables representing agent types associated with distribution F and eF , respectively.
Assume that X hr eX and X rh eX. Let e and  be the optimal threshold function undereX and X, respectively. Then, for any k 2 f1; :::;Kg, e (k)   (k) :
Proof. See Appendix A.
For an intuition, recall the identity (12) with k + 1 replaced by k:
 (k)E
h
XjX < xk
i
+ (1   (k))E
h
XjX > xk
i
= xk.
When the distribution is improved by the likelihood ratio order, both conditional expectations
go up. Thus, in order to keep the average constant at xk, one needs to increase the weight on
the smaller term E

XjX < xk. Thus, the weight of this term must increase and the optimal
threshold is shifted upwards.
5 Large Societies
If the number of voters is large, then we can ignore the integer problem. We also normalize
the threshold (k) by the size of voter population n; and write (k) =  (k + 1), which is
interpreted as the minimal proportion of voters required in order to undertake alternative k.
In a large society, the optimal (second-best) mechanism approximates the welfare max-
imizing mechanism (rst-best), which, as illustrated in Example 1, is not directly imple-
mentable.36 This is intuitive since the aggregate uncertainty vanishes in the limit. For a
simple proof, assume that the ex-ante optimal alternative is l, and consider a xed threshold
mechanism that requires the support of a proportion t of voters where F (xl) < t < F (xl+1).
This mechanism is anonymous, unanimous and DIC, and hence it must be welfare inferior
to the optimal mechanism derived above. The per-capita welfare attained by this mecha-
nism converges to the rst-best when the population size tends to innity since the welfare
maximizing alternative is chosen with a probability that converges to unity.
With linear utility and a large number of voters, the maximization of average utility
coincides with the maximization of the utility of the mean (average) voter. Thus, our optimal
mechanism should pick the alternative favored by the mean voter with probability going to
one. To see that this is indeed the case, assume that the mean voters top alternative is k,
which implies that  2 [xk ; xk+1] and F (xk)  F ()  F (xk+1). With a slight abuse of
notation, we express the function  as a continuous function of type:
 (x) =
E [XjX > x]  x
E [XjX > x]  E [XjX < x] : (13)
It is easy to verify that
 (x) =
F (x)(E [XjX > x]  x)
E [XjX > x]F (x)  + E [XjX > x] [1  F (x)] = F (x)
E [XjX > x]  x
E [XjX > x]  :
36A result in the same spirit for settings with only two alternatives has been obtained by Ledyard and
Palfrey [2002].
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Thus  () = F () and 
 
xk
  F ()    xk+1 ; because  (x) is decreasing by As-
sumption B. This implies that, under our optimal voting thresholds, any alternative k < k
is not likely to be chosen because   xk+1 and thus  (k) =   xk+1 > F (xk+1), while
the alternative k, preferred by the mean voter, will be chosen with probability going to one
because  (k) = 
 
xk+1
  F ().
To conclude, for any distribution of preferences F satisfying our assumptions, a simple
threshold mechanism which requires an F ()-majority for adoption, where  is the mean of
F , is approximately e¢ cient (and optimal) when the number of voters is su¢ ciently large,
types are independent and utility is linear.
5.1 Voting over the Provision of a Public Good
In order to illustrate the above insight in a less abstract setting, we sketch below a very
simple, textbook example about the provision of a public good subject to congestion. There
are n agents, each endowed with an exogenous amount of a private good Mi. An agent i
with type xi has a utility function of the form ui = xiG=
p
n+ Zi where G is the amount of
public good, Zi is the amount of the private good, and the factor of 1=
p
n captures the e¤ect
of congestion.37 Types distribute identically and independently of each other according to
distribution F . Producing G units of the public good costs G2=2 units of the private good.
The cost is equally shared among the agents, so that the only decision is about the level of
public good provision.
Suppose endowments are su¢ ciently large. Individual utility maximization reveals that
each individual i prefers a public good level of Gi =
p
nxi. Preferences over the various levels
of the public good are easily seen to be single-peaked and single-crossing. For each realization
of types, the outcome of simple majority voting produces the Condorcet winnerGsm =
p
nxsm
where xsm is the sample median. In contrast, the e¢ cient production level, that satises
Samuelsons (or Bowens !) well-known condition is such that the sum of individual marginal
rate of substitution must be equal to the social marginal cost. Here we obtain Gs =
p
nxs;
where xs = 1n
P
xi is the sample mean. Given the linear structure, we can identify any level
of public good G with the type xG = G=
p
n for which this level is optimal.
It is obvious, and has been noted by Bowen, that the outcome of majority voting is almost
always ine¢ cient if the distribution of types is skewed, so that the mean and the median do
not coincide. If the number of voters is large so that the sample mean xs and sample median
xsm approach the mean  and median m respectively, too little (too much) public good is
provided by majority voting if the the median m is lower (higher) than the mean . As shown
above, the e¢ cient outcome G can be attained by an F ()-majority rule.
If we normalize each individuals utility without the public good to be zero, we can express
the ine¢ ciency ratio (IR) of simple majority as the ratio between the welfare from the public
37For expositional simplicity we assume here that any level of the public good can be provided, so that the
quantity is continuous.
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good obtained under the simple majority rule and the rst-best outcome as
IR =
m

(2  m

)
where the ratio m is a simple measure of skewness. This function is strictly less than 1 if
m 6= :
5.2 Gini Coe¢ cients and the E¢ cient Supermajority
Let us apply the F ()-majority rule to social decisions that depend on the distribution of
income, where agents with higher income prefer higher decisions. As already seen above,
the necessary correction versus the simple majority rule increases with the skewness of the
distribution. Assume, as in a large number of empirical studies, that the distribution of
income is given by a lognormal distribution with parameters  and .38 Such distributions
are of course skewed, with the mean larger than the median. The Gini coe¢ cient, which is
readily available in practice, is given by g = 2(
p
2=2) 1 where  is the standard normal
CDF. Note that this only depends on . The threshold at the mean as a function of the Gini
coe¢ cient can be computed by
F = 
"p
2
2
 1(
g + 1
2
)
#
;
This threshold is increasing in g; and hence in . For the typical range of Gini coe¢ cients
found in (Western) democracies g 2 [0:25; 0:55] the resulting optimal supermajority does
not vary too much, ranging between 58% and 68%.39
6 Voting with Correlated Types
The optimality calculations in the previous parts were conducted under the basic assump-
tions that types are independent. But, there are numerous situations where the agents
preferences depend on some underlying state of the world, and are thus correlated. Consider,
for example, the decision to change income taxes in an environment where the economys
fundamentals (and hence the governments scal needs) are not constant over time. Indi-
vidual preferences depend then on the economys fundamentals, and hence, presumably, the
optimality conditions should also reect this dependence. As a typical illustration, note that
tax increases over $70 million require a referendum in Missouri, but the legislature can raise
itself such taxes by a two-thirds majority if the governor declares a state emergency (e.g.,
after a ood).40
38We use notational convention here. The parameters  and  of the lognormal distribution determine, but
are not identical to, the mean and the standard deviation.
39As an example, the U.S. has a Gini of :45 and a required threshold of exactly two-thirds.
40See National Conference of State Legislators, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/state-tax-and-
expenditure-limits-2010.aspx
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For another example, consider a monetary committee that votes on interest rates. Mem-
bers usually agree that the optimal rate needs to balance the trade-o¤ between ination and
unemployment, but have di¤erent signals or perceptions about the economy. Relatively pes-
simistic (optimistic) members will be more dovish (hawkish) regarding a raise in the interest
rate. Perceptions depend of course on the prevailing market conditions, and thus types are
again correlated.
Given the ubiquity of examples such as the above, it is of interest to establish whether the
intuitions developed above for the case of independent types continue to hold with correlated
types. Note that the class of anonymous, unanimous and DIC mechanisms is independent
of assumptions about the probability distribution of voterstypes. The same holds for the
sincere equilibria of the successive voting procedure with a decreasing threshold. Thus, the
changes induced by possible correlations will a¤ect our results only via their e¤ect on the
threshold function itself and its calculation.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that the various events of pivotality which deter-
mine the optimal thresholds reveal now information about the underlying state of the world,
and, moreover, the revealed information is inuenced by the imposed thresholds themselves.
Nevertheless, we are able to extend our main insights, albeit under more stringent su¢ cient
conditions.
Assume that there are S states of the world:41 if the state is s 2 f1; :::; Sg, then types
xs distribute identically and independently of each other according to a distribution Fs with
mean s. Let ps  0 denote the probability that the state of the world is s, with
P
ps = 1.
Utilities are assumed here to be linear, as in Section 4.1.
Let  denote the optimal cuto¤ function and apply the same reasoning as in the case of
independent types. Consider any alternative k with  (k   1) >  (k) and k  2. For  to
be optimal, localchanges should weakly decrease the expected social welfare. In particular,
decreasing  (k   1) by 1 while keeping all other cuto¤s unchanged will have any e¤ect only
if there are exactly  (k   1)  1 agents with types in x; xk and n   (k   1) + 1 agents
with types in

xk; x

. In this case, the chosen alternative becomes k   1 instead of k. With
correlated types, however, additional complication arises because this pivotal event a¤ects the
implied probabilities of the states of the world: conditional on having exactly  (k   1)  1
agents with types in

x; xk

and n   (k   1) + 1 agents with types in xk; x, the posterior
probability of state s is
P (sj(k   1)) =
ps
 
n
(k 1) 1
  
Fs(x
k)
(k 1) 1  
1  Fs
 
xk
n (k 1)+1PS
l=1 pl
 
n
(k 1) 1

(Fl (xk))
(k 1) 1
(1  Fl (xk))n 
(k 1)+1 :
Note that this probability depends on the number of agents, on the cuto¤ xk; and on the
assumed threshold (k   1).
41We assume here for simplicity that there is a nite number of states, but the analysis does not depend on
this assumption.
23
The expected social utility from alternative k   1 in this case is given by
nak 1 + bk 1
SX
s=1
P (sj(k   1))
(
( (k   1)  1)E XsjXs < xk
+ (n   (k   1) + 1)E XsjXs > xk
)
: (14)
The expected social utility from alternative k is given by
nak + bk
SX
s=1
P (sj(k   1))
(
( (k   1)  1)E XsjXs < xk
+ (n   (k   1) + 1)E XsjXs > xk
)
: (15)
Because  (k   1) is part of the optimal voting procedure, decreasing  (k   1) by 1 should
weakly decrease the expected social welfare. This implies that expression (15) is weakly
higher than expression (14). This yields
SX
s=1
Hs (k)
 
Fs
 
xk

1  Fs (xk)
!(k 1) 1
(ns (k)   (k   1) + 1)  0; (16)
where the function s for state s is dened by
s (k) =
E[XsjXs > xk]  xk
E[XsjXs > xk]  E[XsjXs < xk] ;
and where the function Hs (k) is dened as
Hs (k) = ps

1  Fs(xk)
n 
E[XsjXs > xk]  E[XsjXs < xk]

: (17)
Similarly, x any alternative k with  (k   1) >  (k) and k  K   1. Increasing  (k) by
1 should also lead to a weakly lower expected social welfare, which yields
SX
s=1
Hs (k + 1)
 
Fs
 
xk+1

1  Fs (xk+1)
!(k)
(ns (k + 1)   (k))  0: (18)
Now let us dene functions Tk (), k = 1; 2; :::;K   1, as
Tk () =
SX
s=1
Hs (k + 1)
 
Fs
 
xk+1

1  Fs (xk+1)
!
(ns (k + 1)  ) : (19)
Our candidate solution  (k) is an integer that satises Tk (   1)  0 and Tk ()  0, i.e.,
that satises inequalities (16) and (18)). In order to ensure that  (k) is well-dened it su¢ ces
to establish that each function Tk is single-crossing in  , i.e., there is a unique  such that
Tk () = 0.
The di¢ culty of proving the single-crossing property (SCP) lies in the fact that the terms
of the form ns (k + 1)   (which were the only relevant terms in the independent case) are
now weighted by the updated probabilities that vary in both the chosen alternative and in the
threshold imposed there. Nevertheless, SCP holds if the states of the world can be ordered
stochastically according to the likelihood ratio order.42 Its proof requires recently developed
tools from the theory of monotone comparative statics (Quah and Strulovici [2012]) that
allow us to aggregate SCPs relevant in each state.
42As in Proposition 2, the combination of the hazard and reversed hazard rate order also su¢ ces here.
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Proposition 3 Assume that (possibly after reordering the states of the world) X1 lr X2 lr
::: lr XS and that each Xs; s = 1; :::; S satises Assumption B. Then, for each k; the
function Tk is single-crossing.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since we are optimizing a bounded function over a discrete and nite domain of monotone
decreasing cuto¤ sequences, an optimal solution always exists. Similarly to the independent
types case, in order to identify the solution by the necessary rst order conditions we also need
to ensure that the two derived inequalities (16) and (18) hold for all alternatives, including
alternatives k with (k   1) = (k): This is proved in Lemma 3 in the Appendix A where,
in addition to the likelihood ratio stochastic dominance and Assumption B, we o¤er a simple
su¢ cient condition under which these two inequalities hold. Finally, this yields
Proposition 4 Assume that X1 lr X2 lr ::: lr XS and that each Xs; s = 1; :::; S satises
Assumption B. Suppose S (k + 1)  1(k) for all k  K   1. Let  (k) be the unique
integer that satises Tk ()  0 and Tk (   1)  0. Then the threshold  (k) is optimal and
the obtained function  is decreasing.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The condition S (k + 1)  1(k) for all k  K   1, imposes restrictions on both agents
utilities and type distributions. It becomes more restrictive when there are more alternatives
(and the interval of types is bounded) and when the distance between the distributions in
the lowest and highest states of the world is large. But it is relatively mild, as illustrated by
the following example.
Example 3 There are two states of the world with distributions F1 = x and F2 = (x)
2
on [0; 1] respectively. It is clear that X1 lr X2. Moreover, 1(k) = 1   xk and 2(k) =
1  12(xk+(xk)2). As should be the case by the above argument, these functions are decreasing
in k and 1(k)  2(k). Then the condition in Proposition 4 requires 2 (k + 1)  1(k) for
all k  K 1, which is equivalent to xk+1  12(
p
8xk + 1 1). Since it is always the case that
xk+1  xk, a mild, su¢ cient condition is xk+1   xk  1=8 = maxx2[0;1] 12(
p
8x+ 1  1)  x.
6.1 Large Societies with Correlated Types
The implementation of the optimal mechanism via a xed threshold when the society is large
(see Section 5 above) clearly hinges on the assumption that uncertainty about the e¢ cient
alternative vanishes in the limit when the number of agents gets large. It fails if there is
uncertainty about the states of the world, and hence residual uncertainty about the best
course of action.
Consider a large society with S states of the world where types xs distribute identically
and independently of each other according to a distribution Fs (with a mean s) if the state
is s 2 f1; :::; Sg. Denote by ks the e¢ cient alternative in state s, preferred by the mean
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voter s: When states are stochastically ordered we obtain that 1  2  :::  S and
therefore k1  k2  :::  kS : A exible threshold (ks) = Fs(s) implements then the
e¢ cient outcome in each state of the world if F1(1)  F2(2)  :::  FS(S).43 It is obvious
that in general this outcome cannot be obtained by a xed threshold policy.
It is interesting to note that for the special case where Fs(x) = 1  e sx we obtain that
Fs(s) = Fs(
 1
s ) = 1   e 1  0:63; so that a xed two-thirds majority is approximately
optimal in all states of the world. The same holds if the states of the world are governed by
lognormal distributions with Gini coe¢ cients in the actual range of Western democracies, so
that the same two-thirds majority obtained above is relatively stable under the typical range
of income inequality.
To conclude, the large-society setting with correlated types forcefully demonstrates the
importance of exible thresholds, and our results are consistent with observed practices that,
for example, adjust legislative hurdles in times of nancial distress or national emergency.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have characterized constrained e¢ cient (i.e., second-best) dominant strategy incentive
compatible and deterministic mechanisms in a setting where privately informed agents have
single-crossing utility functions, but where monetary transfers are not feasible. Our approach
allows a systematic choice among Pareto-e¢ cient mechanisms based on the ex-ante utility
they generate. We have also shown that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a
modication of a widely used voting procedure. This modication is an extension to several
alternatives of the idea behind qualied majorities (or supermajorities) that are also widely
used for binary decisions. In practice, one could use exible thresholds in a simplied way
(e.g., by using only one switching point from a high threshold to a low one) instead of changing
the required threshold for each alternative. Such schemes are already welfare superior to those
using a xed threshold.
An open question is whether random mechanisms can yield a improvement over the deter-
ministic mechanisms studied in this paper. The answer would be clearly negative if one could
show that any probabilistic, DIC and anonymous mechanism is a lottery over deterministic,
DIC and anonymous mechanisms. Peters et al. [2014] prove exactly that on single-peaked
domains satisfying a minimally richness condition. But, their result is not immediately ap-
plicable here, mainly because their incentive compatibility concept is ordinal: a deviation
from truth-telling must be disadvantageous for any cardinal utility representation of the
ordinal single-peaked preferences; thus, their concept is stronger than the incentive compat-
ibility concept for a specic and given cardinal utility function, and it potentially excludes
more mechanisms.
43As an example, consider Fs(x) = (x)s: Then Fs(s) = (
s
s+1
)s , which is decreasing in the parameter
s. Because Fs(s) = s(s); s = 1; 2; :::; S; the condition here is a special case of what was assumed in
Proposition 4 for a nite number of voters.
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Another open question is whether using the more permissive Bayesian incentive com-
patibility concept can improve the performance of constrained e¢ cient mechanisms. It is
instructing to note that in the standard setting with independent types, linear utility and
with monetary transfers, a general welfare equivalence result between dominant strategy in-
centive compatible and Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms has been established
by Gershkov et al. [2013].
Finally, recall that we studied a private value environment in the sense that a voters
payo¤, conditional on the chosen alternative, depends on only his own private information.
Given that in many applications voterspayo¤s often depend on other votersprivate infor-
mation, it will be interesting to study optimal voting rules for information aggregation in an
interdependent value environment.
Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1 Sincere voting is the unique outcome surviving iterated elimination of (weakly)
dominated strategies.44
Proof. The nal vote is between alternatives K and K   1: for any observed history of
previous play, voters with peaks up to and including K   1 have a dominant action, to vote
for K 1, while voters with peak on alternative K must vote for K: Thus, at the rst stage of
elimination, for all players, we can delete the strategies that prescribe an insincere action at
the last vote. Consider now the vote to approve or reject alternative K 2. Voting insincerely
is clearly dominated for all agents with peaks up to and including K   2 (since any outcome
that can be obtained by voting No is worse than any outcome that can be obtained by voting
Yes), and for all agents with peak on alternative K (vice-versa). Thus, we can eliminate
all strategies that prescribe insincere voting at stage K   2 for these types of all agents. It
remains to deal with types having a peak on alternative K   1. If such an agent prefers
alternative K to alternative K   2, then the argument is the same as for an agent with peak
on K, and insincere voting at K   2 is dominated. Look then at an agent with peak on
alternative K   1, who prefers alternative K   2 to K. He may, theoretically, believe that,
given the observed history of play, voting Yes (stopping at K  2) is better, as voting No will
ultimately lead to K, a worse option. But note that the action of such an agent at stage K 2
makes any di¤erence only in the particular instance where there are exactly (K   2)   1
other agents that vote Yes at that stage. By the previous arguments, this set must consist of
all agents with peak up to and including K 2 and, possibly, of some other agents with peak
on K   1 who favor alternative K   2 over K: But then, because (K   1)  (K   2); our
44 If agents have strict ordinal preferences, then a simple condition ensuring that the order of elimination
does not matter is trivially satised in our setting (for example the condition of transference of decision maker
indi¤erence in Marx and Swinkels [1997]). The model with a continuum of types is the limit of models with
a nite number of types (representing the possible ordinal proles) with strict preferences. In the limit, only
a nite number of types (measure zero) do not have strict preferences.
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agent must conclude that, in the only instance where he can a¤ect the outcome, voting No at
stage K   2 (and voting Yes at the next stage, as required) necessarily leads to the adoption
of alternative K   1, his peak. Thus, voting insincerely at K   2 is also dominated for such
agents, and thus for all possible types of all agents. The proof for all earlier stages continues
analogously, and sincere voting after each possible history is the only outcome surviving the
iterated elimination process.
The formal statement of the main theorem in Saporiti [2009] used in the proof of Theorem
1 is as follows:
Theorem 3 (Saporiti, 2009) An unanimous, anonymous mechanism g is DIC if and only
if there exists (n  1) numbers 1; :::; n 1 2 K such that for any type prole (x1; :::; xn) 2
[x; x]n with xi 2 (xki ; xki+1) for all i; it holds that
g (x1; :::; xn) = M(1; :::; n 1; k1; :::; kn);
where the function M returns the median of (1; :::; n 1; k1; :::; kn).
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider the optimal mechanism with decreasing threshold func-
tion . Suppose the optimal threshold function satises  (k   1) >  (k) for some k  2.
Suppose the planner decreases the cuto¤  (k   1) by 1 while keeping all other cuto¤s un-
changed. Because  (k   1) >  (k), the alternative cuto¤ sequence is still monotone and
thus feasible. This change matters only if there are exactly  (k   1)  1 voters with values
below xk and (n+ 1   (k   1)) voters with values above xk (recall that xk is the cuto¤ type
that is indi¤erent between alternative k   1 and alternative k). In this case, by decreasing
the cuto¤  (k   1) by 1, the planner might change the allocation from k to k  1 given that
 (k   1)  1   (k). In this case, the total expected utility from alternative k is given by
[ (k   1)  1]ukx<xk + [n+ 1   (k   1)]ukx>xk :
The total expected utility from alternative k   1 is given by
[ (k   1)  1]uk 1
x<xk
+ [n+ 1   (k   1)]uk 1
x>xk
:
Since the planner (weakly) prefers k to k   1, the total expected utility from alternative k
must be higher than the total expected utility from alternative k   1. This gives us the
following rst-order conditionfor all k  2 with  (k   1) >  (k):
[ (k   1)  1]

ukx<xk   uk 1x<xk

+ [n+ 1   (k   1)]

ukx>xk   uk 1x>xk

 0: (20)
Similarly, suppose the optimal threshold function satises  (k   1) >  (k) for some
k  K   1. Now suppose the planner increases  (k) by 1 while keeping all other cuto¤s
unchanged. Since  (k   1) >  (k) and k  K   1, this alternative cuto¤ sequence is
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still monotone and thus feasible. This change matters only if only if there are exactly  (k)
voters with values below xk+1 and (n   (k)) voters with values above xk+1. In this case,
by increasing the cuto¤  (k) by 1, the planner might change the allocation from k to k + 1
given that  (k + 1)   (k). In this case, the total expected utility from alternative k is
given by
 (k)ukx<xk+1 + [n   (k)]ukx>xk+1 :
The total expected utility from alternative k + 1 is given by
 (k)uk+1
x<xk+1
+ [n   (k)]uk+1
x>xk+1
:
This yields another rst-order conditionfor all k  K   1 with  (k   1) >  (k):
 (k)

ukx<xk+1   uk+1x<xk+1

+ [n   (k)]

ukx>xk+1   uk+1x>xk+1

 0: (21)
These two rst-order conditions can be rewritten as bounds on the cuto¤ functions  (k) :
 (k   1) 
n

uk
x>xk
  uk 1
x>xk


uk 1
x<xk
  uk
x<xk

+

uk
x>xk
  uk 1
x>xk
 + 1;
 (k) 
n

uk
x>xk+1
  uk+1
x>xk+1


uk
x<xk+1
  uk+1
x<xk+1

+

uk+1
x>xk+1
  uk
x>xk+1
 :
We can use the denition (8) of  (k) to rewrite it as
 (k   1)  n (k) + 1, for all k  2; (22)
 (k)  n (k + 1) , for all k  K   1; (23)
which are exactly the inequalities (9) and (10) in the main text. Lemma 2 below shows that
the above two conditions also hold for k with  (k   1) =  (k).
Therefore, we can construct the (generically unique) optimal cuto¤ function  (k) as
follows. We rst derive bounds for  (1) by taking k = 2 in (22) and k = 1 in (23):
n (2)   (1)  n (2) + 1:
Since the two bounds di¤er by 1 and  (1) must be an integer,  (1) is generically unique
and must be equal to dn (2)e ;where dze denotes the smallest integer that is above z. Next,
for all 2  k  K   1, conditions (22) and (23) imply that
n (k + 1)   (k)  n (k + 1) + 1:
Hence,  (k) is also generically unique and must be equal to dn (k + 1)e. Finally, for k = K,
the cuto¤  (K) is xed at 1.
Note that by Assumption B,  is decreasing in k, so the optimal cuto¤ (k) = dn (k + 1)e
is indeed decreasing for all k  K   1. Further note that  (K) > 0, so we must have
 (K   1)  1 =  (K). Therefore, the optimal cuto¤ function  is decreasing.
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To complete the proof, we need to argue that the cuto¤ function  we constructed above
is indeed optimal. Note that we are optimizing a bounded function over a nite domain of
decreasing sequences (k) where  (k)  n for all k and (K) = 1: Thus an optimal solution
always exists. Because the optimal solution has to satisfy the two necessary conditions (22)
and (23), and because there is an essentially unique cuto¤ function that satises these two
conditions, our candidate distribution  must be optimal.
Lemma 2 The bounds (22) and (23) hold for all k 2 K with  (k) =  (k   1).
Proof. First let us dene 1 and 2 as follows:
1 = max fm 2 K :  (m) = ng ;
2 = min fm 2 K and m  K   1 :  (m) = 1g :
We need to consider four cases.
Case 1: Both 1 and 2 exist. Then by denition, we have  (1) = ::: =  (1) = n,
 (1 + 1) < n,  (2) = ::: =  (K) = 1 and  (2   1) > 1. An alternative k with
 (k) =  (k   1) could belong to one of the following three possible scenarios:
(i) k  1. Then  (k) = n and condition (23) holds trivially. We only need to prove
condition (22). By denition of 1;  (1) >  (1 + 1). Thus, (22) must hold at 1 + 1:
 (1)  n (1 + 1) + 1:
Therefore, we have
 (k   1) =  (k) =  (1)  n (1 + 1) + 1  n (k) + 1;
where the second inequality follows because  is decreasing and 1 + 1 > k.
(ii) k  2 + 1. Then  (k) =  (2) = 1 and condition (22) is trivially satised, and we
only need to prove condition (23). By denition of 2,  (2   1) >  (2). So we have (23)
hold at 2:
 (2)  n (2 + 1) :
Therefore,
 (k) =  (2)  n (2 + 1)  n (k + 1) :
Again, the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of  () and the fact that k  2+ 1.
(iii) k 2 (1; 2 + 1). Dene k1 and k2 as follows:
k1 = max fm 2 K :  (m) >  (k)g ;
k2 = min fm 2 K :  (m) <  (k)g :
Its clear that both k1 and k2 are well dened for all k 2 (1; 2), and k1 < k < k2. By
denition of k1 and k2, we have
 (k1) >  (k1 + 1) = ::: =  (k   1) =  (k) = ::: =  (k2   1) >  (k2) :
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Therefore, both conditions (23) and (22) hold at k1 + 1 and k2. In particular,
 (k1 + 1)  n (k1 + 2) and  (k2   1)  n (k2) + 1:
Since  (k   1) =  (k), we must have k1  k  1 or equivalently k  k1+ 1. It follows from
the monotonicity of  that
 (k) =  (k1 + 1)  n (k1 + 2)  n (k + 1) ;
which is (23). Similarly, we can use the monotonicity of  and the fact that k2 > k to obtain
 (k   1) =  (k2   1)  n (k2) + 1  n (k) + 1;
which is (22).
Case 2: Neither 1 nor 2 exists. Then the argument of Case 1(iii) applies for all k with
 (k   1) =  (k).
Case 3: 1 exists but 2 does not. Consider alternative k with  (k   1) =  (k). If
k  1, the argument of Case 1(i) applies. If k > 1, the argument of Case 1 (iii) applies.
Case 4: 2 exists but 1 does not. Consider alternative k with  (k   1) =  (k). If
k  2 + 1, the argument of Case 1(ii) applies. If k < 2 + 1; the argument of Case 1(iii)
applies.
Proof of Proposition 2. Observe that, under distribution F ,
 (k)  E

XjX > xk  xk
E [XjX > xk]  E [XjX  xk]
=
E

XjX > xk  xk
E [XjX > xk]  xk + xk   E [XjX  xk]
=
1
1 +
xk E[XjXxk]
E[XjX>xk] xk
:
Similarly, under distribution eF , we can obtain the corresponding e (k) as
e (k) = 1
1 + x
k E[ eXj eXxk]
E[ eXj eX>xk] xk
:
Note that, for any x 2 [x; x],
X  hr eX ) E [XjX > x]  E[ eXj eX > x]
X  rh eX ) E [XjX  x]  E[ eXj eX > x]
Therefore, we have e (k)   (k) under the assumptions given in the proposition. As a result,
we must have e (k)   (k) for all k.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the function Tk and express each component in this
summation as
Zk( ; s) = Hs(k + 1) (s(k + 1))
 (ns(k + 1)  )
where Hs(k + 1) is dened in (17) and
s(k + 1) =
Fs
 
xk+1

1  Fs (xk+1) :
Then, each Zk is single-crossing in  on [0; n] since the function  (n   ) is rst positive,
zero at  = n, and then negative. The function H does not play here any role. Look now
at s and s0 such that Xs lr Xs0 . Then by usual stochastic dominance and the monotonicity
of function x1 x on [0; 1]; we have
s(k+1)
s0 (k+1)
< 1. In addition, the proof of Proposition 2 shows
that the likelihood ratio order implies s(k + 1) > s0(k + 1). Look now at the ratio:
Zk( ; s)
Zk( ; s0)
=
Hs(k + 1)
Hs0(k + 1)

s(k + 1)
s0(k + 1)
 ns(k + 1)  
ns0(k + 1)  
:
Since s(k + 1) > s0(k + 1); we know that ns0(k + 1)   < 0 if ns(k + 1)   < 0. Thus
the ratio Zk( ;s)Zk( ;s0) is negative only on the interval [ns0(k + 1); ns(k + 1)]. By Theorem 1
of Quah and Strulovici [2012], the function Tk() =
P
s Zk( ; s) will be single-crossing in 
if for each parameters s; s0; the ratio Zk( ;s)Zk( ;s0) is increasing in  on the interval [ns0(k + 1);
ns(k+ 1)]. Since  is not a variable of the functions Hs and Hs0 , it is su¢ cient to check the
derivative of a function of the form v (n   )=  n0   , where v = =0 < 1 and  > 0,
on the interval [n0; n]. Its derivative with respect to  is
v 
n0   2 [n   n0 + (ln v) (n   )  n0   ] > 0
because ln v < 0 and n0 <  < n.
Lemma 3 Assume that X1 lr X2 lr ::: lr XS and that each Xs; s = 1; :::; S satises
Assumption B. Assume also that S (k + 1)  1(k) for all k  K   1. Then conditions
(16) and (18) hold for all k 2 K with  (k) =  (k   1).
Proof. This lemma extends Lemma 2 to the case with correlated types, and the proof follows
the same steps as before. Dene 1 and 2 as follows:
1 = max fm 2 K :  (m) = ng ;
2 = min fm 2 K and m  K   1 :  (m) = 1g :
We need to consider four cases.
Case 1: Both 1 and 2 exist. Then, by denition, we have  (1) = ::: =  (1) = n,
 (1 + 1) < n,  (2) = ::: =  (K) = 1 and  (2   1) > 1. An alternative k with
 (k) =  (k   1) could belong to one of the following three possible scenarios:
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(i) k  1. Then  (k) = n and condition (18) holds trivially. We only need to prove
condition (16). By denition of 1;  (1) >  (1 + 1). Thus, it is feasible to decrease
 (1) by 1, so condition (16) must hold at 1 + 1. That is,
SX
s=1
Hs (1 + 1)

Fs (x
1 + 1)
1  Fs (x1+1)
(1) 1
(ns (1 + 1)   (1) + 1)  0:
Note that by likelihood ratio order, 1 (1 + 1)  2 (1 + 1)  :::  S (1 + 1). Therefore,
in order for the above inequality to hold, it must be the case that
nS (1 + 1)   (1) + 1  0:
By assumption S (1 + 1)  1 (1), and by monotonicity of , we have 1 (1)  1 (k).
These two inequalities imply that
S (1 + 1)  1 (k) :
As a result,
n1 (k)   (1) + 1  0
Again by likelihood ratio order, 1 (k)  2 (k)  :::  S (k) for all k, so we must have
ns (k)   (1) + 1  0, for all s = 1; :::; S:
By denition of 1, we have  (k   1) =  (1), so
ns (k)   (k   1) + 1  0, for all s = 1; :::; S:
But this implies that condition (16) holds at k.
(ii) k  2 + 1. Then  (k) =  (2) = 1 and condition (16) is trivially satised, and we
only need to prove condition (18). By denition of 2,  (2   1) >  (2). So it is feasible
to increase  (2) by 1, which indicates that (18) must hold at 2:
SX
s=1
Hs (2 + 1)
 
Fs
 
x2+1

1  Fs (x2+1)
!(2)
(ns (2 + 1)   (2))  0:
Since 1 (2 + 1)  :::  S (2 + 1) by the likelihood ratio order, it must be the case that
n1 (2 + 1)   (2)  0:
Since 1 (2 + 1)  S (2 + 2) by assumption, and S (2 + 2)  S (k + 1) by monotonicity
of S , we have
nS (k + 1)   (2)  0:
Again by the likelihood ratio order, 1 (k + 1)  2 (k + 1)  :::  S (k + 1), so we must
have
ns (k + 1)   (2)  0, for all s = 1; :::; S:
33
By denition of 2, we know  (k) =  (2). Hence,
ns (k + 1)   (k)  0, for all s = 1; :::; S:
Therefore, condition (18) must hold at k.
(iii) k 2 (1; 2 + 1). Dene k1 and k2 as follows:
k1 = max fm 2 K :  (m) >  (k)g ;
k2 = min fm 2 K :  (m) <  (k)g :
Its clear that both k1 and k2 are well dened for all k 2 (1; 2 + 1), and k1 < k < k2. By
denition of k1 and k2, we have
 (k1) >  (k1 + 1) = ::: =  (k   1) =  (k) = ::: =  (k2   1) >  (k2) :
Therefore, both conditions (16) and (18) hold at k1 + 1 and k2. In particular,
SX
s=1
Hs (k2)
 
Fs
 
xk2

1  Fs (xk2)
!(k2 1) 1
(ns (k2)   (k2   1) + 1)  0;
and
SX
s=1
Hs (k1 + 2)
 
Fs
 
xk1+2

1  Fs (xk1+2)
!(k1+1)
(ns (k1 + 2)   (k1 + 1))  0:
Similar to what we argued previously for Case 1(i) and (ii), in order for these two inequalities
to hold, we must have
nS (k2)   (k2   1) + 1  0; and n1 (k1 + 2)   (k1 + 1)  0:
By denition of k1 and k2, we have  (k1 + 1) =  (k   1) =  (k) =  (k2   1). Hence we
can rewrite the above two inequalities as
nS (k2)   (k   1) + 1  0; and n1 (k1 + 2)   (k)  0:
Furthermore, by a similar argument as above, we can show that
S (k2)  1 (k2   1)  1 (k)  2 (k)  :::  S (k)
and
1 (k1 + 2)  S (k1 + 1)  S (k + 1)  S 1 (k + 1)  :::  1 (k + 1) :
Therefore, we must have
ns (k)   (k   1) + 1  0; and ns (k + 1)   (k)  0, for all s = 1; :::; S:
Therefore, conditions (16) and (18) must hold at k.
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Case 2: Neither 1 nor 2 exists. Then the argument of Case 1(iii) applies for all k with
 (k   1) =  (k).
Case 3: 1 exists but 2 does not. Consider alternative k with  (k   1) =  (k). If
k  1, the argument of Case 1(i) applies. If k > 1, the argument of Case 1 (iii) applies.
Case 4: 2 exists but 1 does not. Consider alternative k with  (k   1) =  (k). If
k  2 + 1, the argument of Case 1(ii) applies. If k < 2 + 1; the argument of Case 1(iii)
applies.
Proof of Proposition 4. It remains to verify that the constructed  is monotone. Note
that each function s, s = 1; 2; :::; S is decreasing in k by Assumption B. Moreover, it holds
that 1 (k)  2 (k)  :::  S (k) for all k by the likelihood ratio ordering of the types across
states (see the proof of Proposition 2). Consider again the function
Tk () =
SX
s=1
Hs (k + 1)
 
Fs
 
xk+1

1  Fs (xk+1)
!
(ns (k + 1)  ) :
Let k be the (possible real valued) solution to the equation Tk () = 0. Dene ks = ns(k+1)
for each s = 1; 2; :::; S. Then k1  k2  :::  kS , and it must hold that k1  k  kS .
Similarly, we must have k 11  k 1  k 1S . The assumption S (k + 1)  1(k) in the
proposition then implies that k 11  kS . It immediately follows that k  k 1. Therefore,
we must have  (k)   (k   1) for all k  K   1, given that (k) is the smallest integer
such that (k)  k.
Appendix B: Su¢ cient Conditions for Assumption B
Note rst that requiring of  (k) to be decreasing in k is equivalent to requiring
uk 1
x<xk
  uk
x<xk
uk
x>xk
  uk 1
x>xk
to be increasing in k. To derive su¢ cient conditions for Assumption B, we let hk (x) denote
the utility di¤erence for a type-x agent from two adjacent alternatives k and k   1:
hk(x) = u
k 1 (x)  uk (x) :
We claim that if the random variables fhk (x)gk2K are ordered in terms of both hazard rate
order and reverse hazard rate order, that is, hk hr hk+1 and hk rh hk+1, then Assumption
B holds.45 To see this, note that we can write
uk 1
x<xk
  ukx<xk = E[hk(x) j x < xk] = E[hk(x) j hk(x) > 0]
45Note that conditions hk hr hk+1 and hk rh hk+1 impose restrictions on the shapes of both the distri-
bution F and the utility function u. Alternatively, if we assume F is uniform, we could explicitly derive the
required conditions for Assumption B only on function u. On the other hand, if we assume that the utility
function u is linear as in Section 4.1, the required conditions for Assumption B impose restrictions only on
the distribution F (see Assumption B).
35
where the second equality follows from the denition of cuto¤ xk and the single-crossing
property. By rewriting uk
x>xk
  uk 1
x>xk
analogously, we obtain
uk 1
x<xk
  uk
x<xk
uk
x>xk
  uk 1
x>xk
=  E[hk(x) j hk(x) > 0]
E[hk(x) j hk(x) < 0] :
Note that hk hr hk+1 implies that E[hk(x) j hk(x) > 0] is increasing in k, and hk rh hk+1
implies that E[hk(x) j hk(x) < 0] is increasing in k. Therefore,  (k) is decreasing in k.
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